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Beyond Postmodernity
in Mathematics Education?
Ole Skovsmose1

Abstract: A radical form of postmodernity is presented with reference to
Nietzsche’s ideas with respect to truth, knowledge, sciences, progress,
democracy, and ethical values in general. Thereafter is presented Foucault’s
archaeology of knowledge. This brings us forward to the notion of genealogy,
which is a defining idea for the postmodern conception of critique. However, it is
emphasised that a critique can address the generativity of mathematical
rationality by considering mathematics-based fabrications. Finally, imagination is
presented as yet another feature of a critical enterprise. It is illustrated how such a
three dimensional critical enterprise is relevant for both mathematics and
mathematics education. In this way the paper suggests moving beyond the
postmodern outlook.

Key-words: critique, genealogy, generativity, fabrication, imagination,
postmodernity, mathematics, mathematics education.

Whilst postmodernity has brought new profoundness to critical activities, it has
also formed some limitations. I find it important to address both aspects and in
that way try to move beyond postmodernity. I am going to discuss this possible
move with reference to mathematics and mathematics education.
The label postmodernity has been used widely with reference to new
trends in architecture, art, and literature which break with modernist principles; it
has been used with reference to new conditions for knowledge production; and it
has been used in social theorising to refer to new social and cultural phenomena. I
am going to use postmodernity as a reference to a critique of Modernity, and I will
concentrate on philosophical aspects of this critique.
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Modernity itself can be associated with some general conceptions of
science: that natural sciences will be able to reveal the secrets of nature, and that
science in general can be both objective and neutral. An integral feature of
Modernity is the recognition of the importance of science, knowledge and
education, and the whole Enlightenment project makes integral these aspects of
the modern outlook. Furthermore, Modernity can be associated with the
emergence of ideas about democracy, freedom, and equality. Clusters of such
different ideas are brought together by the notion of progress: self-improvement is
a human possibility.2
Taking a closer look at the modern period we find that very different
socio-political phenomena developed together with the scientific discoveries, the
formulation for democratic ideals, and the preoccupations about enlightenment
and progress. Colonialism and exploitation took many forms, racism as well.
During Modernity one finds laborious attempts at providing a scientific
underpinning of racist classifications of human beings as being more of less
developed. Similar classifications were applied to languages: some were identified
as being more developed and complex than others. Such ethnic and linguistic
classifications were weaved together with notions of progress and development
and theorised into grand discourses that could legitimate colonialism and
suppression.3 Zigmunt Bauman made a gloomy addition to such observations by
emphasising that even the holocaust can be seen as being made possible through
discourses established within modernity.4 With such observations we have entered
a fierce critique of Modernity, and this is what postmodernity is about.
Let me try to summarise how we are going to proceed. I will present the
most radical form of postmodernity by outlining some of Nietzsche’s ideas about
truth, knowledge, science, progress, democracy, and ethical values in general.
Then I will present an example of the archaeology of knowledge by referring to
studies by Foucault. This brings us forward to the notion of genealogy, which is
defining for the postmodern conception of critique. I will discuss genealogy with
respect to mathematics education and emphasise the extreme importance of this
line of critique. However, I will then emphasise that a critique addressing
fabrications that can be related to mathematical rationality is crucial as well.
Finally, I want to add imagination as crucial for a critical activity. By bringing
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For a discussion of the notion of progress see Bury (1955), and Nisbet (1980).
See, for instance, Said’s study of orientalism (1979).
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See Bauman (1989).
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together genealogy, fabrication and imagination I try to broaden and deepen
critical enterprises, and in this way to move beyond postmodernity.

1. Nietzsche’s radical postmodernity
Friedrich Nietzsche confronted the official grand narratives of Modernity.5 He
found that Modernity – although it had taken steps away from orthodox
Christianity –was still lingering in a religious world-view. Nietzsche
acknowledged that since Descartes all philosophers had tried “to assassinate the
old concept of the soul”, and in this way philosophers have attempted to
“assassinate the basic assumption of Christian doctrine.” However, Nietzsche’s
point is that “overtly or covertly modern philosophy is anti-Christian, although it
is by no means anti-religious” (Beyond Good and Evil, §54). And this is the
problem.
Maybe modern philosophy has assassinated the soul and other religious
notions, but it maintains a religious outlook by installing new idols. The modern
idols have the form of philosophical ideas through which reality becomes judged.
Nietzsche’s postmodernity hammers into pieces any such idols. Let us look at
them one by one.
The idea of truth. According to Nietzsche there is no truth to be found
anywhere.6 We talk, and not least through Modern philosophy, as if we are able to
discover truths. The distinction between appearance and reality plays a
fundamental role in the modern world view, as presented by Descartes, Galilei,
Locke and many others; it was crucial as well for the formulation of Platonism
which Nietzsche is also attacking. The distinction points out that behind
appearance there is reality, and the claim is that true knowledge concerns this
reality. But, according to Nietzsche, there is no reality behind appearance: “The
‘apparent’ world is the only one: the ‘real’ world has only been lyingly added…”
(Twilight of the Idols, Reason in Philosophy, §2).7 The reality behind appearance
5

In Ecce Homo Nietzsche makes comments on his previous publications and about
Beyond Good and Evil he states that it is in essence a critique of modernity (Ecce
Homo, Beyond Good and Evil, §2). It could naturally be added that Nietzsche
confronted much more than the Modern outlook: Christianity in general and the
whole philosophical tradition since Plato.
6
See also Clark (1990).
7
In this and all other citations the italics is made by Nietzsche in the original.
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is a myth. There is no reality which truth is about. Nietzsche asks: “What, then, is
truth?” And he answers: “A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and
anthropomorphism – in short, a sum of human relations which have been
enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after
long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions
about which one has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors which are
worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and
now matter only as metal, no longer as coins.” (“On Truth and Lie in an ExtraMoral Sense”) Truth has no permanence; it is an illusion. Truth is not about
anything; it is a way of talking; it is a mobile army of metaphors. Truth is just a
modern idol that has substituted ideas about the existence of paradise and of an
eternal life after death.
The idea of knowledge. Nietzsche introduces a radical perspectivism.8
There are no points outside the stream of life from where one can look at things,
judge things, and formulate true statements. One is instead submerged into this
stream. Nietzsche’s perspectivism destroys any hope of establishing knowledge,
according to any Modern aspirations. What is called knowledge does not represent
any “insight” about certain states of affairs. As a consequence, Nietzsche reaches
an epistemic Darwinism: “It is improbable that our ‘knowledge’ should extend
further than the strictly necessary for the preservation of life. Morphology shows
us how the senses and the nerves, as well as the brain, develop in proportion to the
difficulties in finding nourishment.” (1968: 272, §494) Formulated differently,
one can see the brain as an organ among other organs. It is an organ necessary for
our survival. The secretions produced by the brain are no more unique than the
secretions produced by any other of our organs. Sweat is necessary for our
survival, and so is knowledge. That we happen to call the output from the brain
“knowledge” does not make it any different than any other forms of biological
extracts.9 The problem, however, is that the notion of knowledge, through
immense philosophical misinterpretation, has become reified as an idol.
The idea of science. If knowledge is not about anything, and certainly not
about truth, what then to think of science, the celebrated institution of Modernity?
Just a different idol. Science cannot represent any search for truth as there is no
such thing to search for. What then to think of the phenomenon that is in fact

8
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See also Hales and Welshon (2000).
Nietzsche states that the “sense for truth” will have to legitimise itself as a “means
for the preservation for man, as will to power” (The Will to Power, §495). The
sense for truths is useful like any other senses. It helps to ensure our survival.
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referred to as science? Nietzsche simply states: “A ‘scientific’ interpretation of the
world, as you understand it, might therefore be the most stupid of all possible
interpretations of the world, meaning that it would be one of the poorest in
meaning.” (The Gay Science, §373)
The idea of progress. It have been claimed that progress is a defining
element in Modernity. In the essay “A Discourse on Inequality” from 1755,
Rousseau emphasises that, contrary to animals, human beings have a “faculty of
self-improvement”.10 This idea is axiomatic for the whole Enlightenment, which
claims that knowledge and education are crucial for the common welfare and for
progress in general. The Encyclopaedia, to which Rousseau also contributed, is an
expression of the idea that knowledge should be collected and divulgated
broadly.11 Nietzsche just shrugs his shoulders: “The last thing I promise is to
improve humanity.” (Ecce Homo, Prologue §2, my translation) And even more
explicit: “ ‘Progress’ is merely a modern idea, that is to say a false idea.” (The
Anti-Christ, §4)
The idea of democracy. As progress is an illusion, one should not expect
Nietzsche to think any better of democracy, which has been celebrated as part of
modern progress. Nietzsche has not anything positive to say about the French
Revolution, and in general he finds nothing worthwhile captured by notions like
liberty, equality and fraternity. Instead Nietzsche sees democracy as a miserable
expression of a herd moral: “Indeed, with the help of a religion that played along
with and flattered the most sublime desires of the herd animal, we have reached
the point of finding an ever more visible expression of this morality even in the
political and social structures: the democratic movement is Christianity’s heir.”
(Beyond Good and Evil, §202)12 Furthermore he characterises “modern
democracy … as the decaying form of the state” (Twilight if Idols, §39). Nietzsche
is certainly not to be found in any democratic camp.
Ethical values. According to Nietzsche, the slave morality put values
upside down by celebrating the poor, powerless, suffering, deprived, sick, ugly,
etc., and by nominating the noble, powerful, and beautiful as evil, cruel, lustful
10

See Rousseau (1984: 88).
It should be noted that Rousseau not only presented the notion of selfimprovement; he also developed a counter story to the general celebration of
progress by commemorating the natural state of affairs.
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Nietzsche also observes: “The overall degeneration of man, right down to what
social fools and flatheads call their ‘man of the future’ (their ideal!); this
degeneration and diminution of man into a perfect heard animal; this bestialization
of man into a dwarf animal with equal rights and claim is possible, no doubt about
that!” (Beyond Good and Evil, §203)
11
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insatiable, and godless (Genealogy of Morality, First treatise, §7). This slave
morality is, according to Nietzsche, contrary to life as “life itself in its essence
means appropriating, injuring, overpowering those who are foreign and weaker;
oppression, harshness, forcing one’s own form on others, incorporation, and at the
very least, at the very mildest, exploration” (Beyond Good and Evil, §259). Thus
Nietzsche emphasises that “ ‘exploitation’ is not part of the decadent and
imperfect, primitive society: it is part of the fundamental nature of living things,
as its fundamental organic function; it is a consequence of the true will to power,
which is simply a will to life” (Beyond Good and Evil, §259). After such claims it
is not surprising that Nietzsche sees democracy as an idol; just a modernised
version of slave morality.
It would be a risky business to try to assume the whole Nietzsche package
including all its pre-modern post-modernity. And this is not what has been done,
but Nietzsche’s radical post-modernity has inspired many.13 His radicalism invites
for a deconstruction of celebrated ideals. The notion of deconstruction was
formulated by Jacques Derrida in On Grammatology first published in 1967, and I
find that this notion describes precisely what Nietzsche is suggesting as well as
what many postmodern investigations are completing.14 I will use it as a general
characteristic of postmodern critical endeavours, naturally acknowledging that
Nietzsche talked about genealogy when identifying ideas as idols. The general
claim is that behind apparently decent scientific standards, aspirations about
progress, ethical values etc, one will find much less noble forces acting out. The
aim of a genealogy (a deconstruction) is to reveal this reality – so different from
any idealist reality that has just been “lyingly added”.

2. Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge
According to modern standards, science should not be subjective, but objective; it
should not include special priorities or particular perspectives, but distance itself
13

See Deleuze (1986) for a careful interpretation of Nietzsche’s ideas in general and in
particular between the Apollonian and Dionysian ways of life.
14
Derrida is inspired by Heidegger who uses the notion Abbau, for deconstruction ideas.
This German word resonates with Aufbau, which means construction. Thus Aufbau and
Abbau can be seen as an inverse processes. Abbau can been read as destruction, but it is
better understood as an unmaking, thus Derrida emphasises: “The movements of a
deconstruction do not destroy structures from the outside” (Derrida, 1974: 24)
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from any interests. Furthermore it was assumed that science, due to its own
intrinsic dynamic, does in fact acknowledge such demands. So, if one just lets
science develop according to its intrinsic standards it will reach objectivity and
neutrality. Thus science is an expression of solid epistemic standards.
Inspired by Nietzsche, one should consider the trust in science as being a
variation of a religious trust, just worshipping different idols – as false as any
other idols. In “Truth and Juridical Forms”, Michel Foucault refers several times
to Nietzsche as an important source of inspiration. Foucault does not address
natural science, but concentrates on psychology, psychiatry and related
discourses. He pursues the idea that the polished surface of sciences covers a
muddled situation. He presents his archaeology of knowledge in terms of a
genealogy. Through detailed historical studies he demonstrates how any claim
about objectivity and neutrality evaporates. What constitutes facts at a particular
historical moment becomes questioned in the next moment. Facts appear timedependent as do truth and scientific categories.15 It appears that science is
developing, not in any continuous process of accumulation, but sometimes in
surprising and apparently irregular ways. In the interview “Truth and Power”
Foucault refers to a particular observation that illustrates his point: “In a science
like medicine, for instance, up to the end of the eighteenth century one has a
certain type of discourse whose gradual transformation, within a period of twentyfive or thirty years, broke not only with the ‘true’ propositions it had hitherto been
possible to formulate but also, more profoundly, with the ways of speaking and
seeing, the whole ensemble of practices, which served the purpose of medical
knowledge.” (Foucault, 2000: 114)
One has to do with some overall and radical changes of a scientific
outlook. In some places Foucault talks about an episteme as comprising a broad
set of ideas, assumptions, conception, priorities that function as a scientific world
view for a particular science at a particular moment. Foucault also uses the notion
of discourse for such a world view. So what Foucault is referring to above is a
change of a medical discourse taking place within a relatively short period. This
change included changes of what were considered true propositions, and as
emphasised by Foucault this change included not only a change in ways of
talking; it also included changes of medical practices. As sciences become
constituted through discourses, and discourses are condensing complexities of
ideas, priorities, interests, etc., sciences becomes deprived of all idealised
15

It is interesting to compare this observation with Grabiner (1986), who asks if
mathematical truths are time-dependent.
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standards. Discourses are expression of powers, and as a consequence knowledge
and power becomes intimately connected. Thus through his genealogy, Foucault
deconstructed any idealised conception of science. In fact we have got close to
Nietzsche’s perspectivism including the observation that behind any idealised
surface there exists a chaos of powers.
This dynamics becomes condensed by Foucault through the notion of
“regime of truth”. In the interview “Truth and Power” Foucault states: “Each
society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth – that is, the types of
discourse it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances that
enable one to distinguish true and false statements; the means by which each is
sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of
truth: that status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.”
(Foucault, 2000: 131) So what Foucault observed with respect to medicine was a
change of a regime of truths. And, as pointed out, it is possible to observe such
changes with respect to many different scientific discourses. Through the notion
of “regime of truths” Foucault draws directly on Nietzsche’s characteristic of truth
as “mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphism”.
Through his investigations of discourses Foucault made an important
contribution to critical enterprises. He showed that what is assumed to be stable is
far from being so. Truth is time-dependent; it is context-dependent; it is powerdependent; it is dependent on whatever. The notion of fact has simple become
dissolved through Foucault’s acid deconstruction.

3. Genealogy
Foucault’s studies of genealogy have inspired many critical investigations of
education and of mathematics education. Let me, however, concentrate on the
later.16
Many general formulations that accompany mathematics education are in
need of being deconstructed. Thus in official documents one can read, most often
in a highly elaborated vocabulary, that the aim of mathematics education is to
provide mathematical knowledge that can be of general interest for society and of
personal relevance for the students. Such formulations assume that knowledge and
16

For Foucault-inspired discussions of education see, for instance, Popkewitz and
Brennan (Eds.) (1998).
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education provide an important source of welfare, both for the society and for the
individual. With reference to educational practice and acknowledging the
formulated aims, one finds many suggestions for improving classroom practice.
This reflects another of the grand ideas of Modernity, namely that improvements
and progress always have to be worked for.
Genealogies have pulled aside such decorative formulations, and there is
much inspiration to be found in Foucault’s work for doing so. In Discipline and
Punish, Foucault talks about discipline, disciplinary society, and disciplinary
institutions, and among them the school. With reference to the military Foucault
states that “discipline increases the skill of each individual, coordinates these
skills, accelerates movements, increases fire power”, etc. (Foucault, 1991: 210).
Discipline is a defining element in military efficiency. Similar observations,
however, apply equally as well to workplaces, hospitals, prisons, and schools:
“The disciplines functions increasingly as techniques for making useful
individual” (Foucault, 1991: 211). Usefulness can be applied to any category of
people and to any institutions in society. However, at the same time “usefulness”
is defined with reference to a specific social order. Thus Foucault emphasises that
the “growth of a capitalist economy gave rise to the specific modality of
disciplinary power” (Foucault, 1991: 221. This power imposes a “political
anatomy” in all kinds of institutions, also in schools.
To this observation one just need to add that mathematics as a school
discipline also functions as a discipline in Foucault’s interpretation of the word.
With reference to Foucault, one could claim that mathematics education is
observing the political anatomy necessary for establishing usefulness. This
observation implies that the formulated aims and good intentions that accompany
mathematics education are only serving a decorative purpose. They are lyingly
added. Our society is organised according to the demands of the free market, and
the educational institutions are docilely responding to the definition of
“usefulness” as exercised by this market; mathematics education as well. Such
observations bring Thomas Popkewitz to summarise and deconstruct the Modern
self-understanding in the following way: “Mathematics is one of the high priests
of modernity. Mathematics education carries a salvation narrative of progress into
the upbringing practices of schooling. The mathematics of the school is told as a
story of progress about the cultured, modern individual whose reason is bounded
by the rules ands standards of science and mathematics. The narrative is of the
enlightened citizen who contributes to the global knowledge society” (Popkewitz,
2004: 251-252). This is a self-understanding that covers the disciplinary reality of
mathematics education.
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Let me try to summarise some of the very many observations addressing
mathematics education as a disciplinary institution. One characterising feature of
mathematics education is the many exercises that – lesson after lesson after lesson
– are presented to the students. Considering general formulations about, say,
leaning mathematics and creativity, the regime of exercises seems paradoxical.
However, this regime can be interpreted as preparing for what I have called a
prescription readiness.17 This readiness refers to a capacity of completing small
tasks that are defined from outside, that should not be questioned, and that should
be completed promptly and with accuracy. Such a prescription readiness makes
part of the political anatomy, which defines what is useful and what is not. It can
be identified as one of disciplinary features of mathematics education.
Mathematics education makes part of an extended system of tests,
examinations, and labellings, which can be considered crucial for establishing the
anatomy of the coming labour force. This force needs to be useful; however, there
are very many forms for usefulness. For the functioning of the whole capitalist
machinery of production, administration, surveillance, transport, economic
transactions, etc. one needs a differentiated labour force with very different
qualifications. Thus the capitalist machinery operates with a matrix of different
forms of usefulness, and this makes a meticulous labelling of individuals crucial.
The educational system is taking care of this. As a consequence, students leaving
the education system can be located in the proper cell in this matrix of usefulness.
A careful labelling of products put out at the market makes things easier for the
consumers. This also applies to the labour market of the capitalist society. Among
the different school disciplines, mathematics appears eager to provide labels.
Mathematics education makes part a network of power relations. Thus to
understand what is taking place in the mathematical classroom cannot simply be
studied this classroom. One needs to consider the whole context of schooling. On
several occasions, Paola Valero has presented a diagram with a teacher-studentmathematics triangle in its centre, representing the activities in the mathematics
classroom. However, she emphasises that this triangle only represents a small part
of a grander network, including: youth culture, labour market, family, community,
teacher education, staff, school leadership, mathematics education research,
international comparisons, policy-making, academic mathematics, technological
and scientific development, etc.18 All such factors, and in particular the power

17
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See Skovsmose (2008)
See Paola Valero’s figure as shown in Menghini, et al. (Eds.), (2008: 286).
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relations between them, are relevant for interpreting the actual disciplinary
functions of mathematics education.
Many postmodern analyses have tended to stop at this point. This would in
fact be in accordance with Foucault’s approach. A genealogy reveals the powers
that operate behind the educational scenery. Naturally we could ask: And what
then? Considering the result of the deconstruction, how to improve the
educational reality? By formulating such questions we might be sliding away
from a postmodern approach. Thus we have to remind ourselves of Nietzsche’s
remark: “The last thing I promise is to improve humanity.” And this formulation
can easily be translated into: The last thing a deconstruction could promise is to
improve mathematics education. In fact a proper deconstruction – not assuming
any of the modern ideals (or idols) including a notion like progress – must leave
things as deconstructed.
Many postmodern approaches have assumed this position. I acknowledge
that any form of genealogy in terms of a deconstruction is important. However, I
do not want to assume that a genealogy represent the whole range of critical
approaches. I want to address two more elements by addressing fabrication and
imagination. This way I want to bring critical enterprises beyond a post-modern
outlook.

4. Fabrication
As the notion indicates, a genealogy is working its way back in time. Through his
archaeology, Foucault presented a history of “the given”; he demonstrated how a
scientific discourse, a particular regime of truth, become established as a
conglomerate of preconceptions. Such critical investigations are powerful, I fully
acknowledge this. I want, however, to point out that there are other forms of
critical investigations also relevant for mathematics education. Let me illustrate
what I have in mind by referring to mathematics. An archaeology with respect to
mathematical ideas will dig into theirs historical origin and try to reveal how
knowledge-power dialectics makes part of their genealogy.
One can, however, also address the rationality of mathematics by
investigating what can be accomplished through this rationality. What does it
mean to bring this rationality into operation? What can be generated through this
rationality? What possibilities can be established? What dangers and risks can be
established as well? This brings us to consider what can be fabricated by means of
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mathematics, and in what follows this notion has to be interpreted in a general
philosophical way as referring to homo faber. I see questions about fabrications as
being different from those addressed by a genealogy. While a genealogy concerns
the past, fabrications concern the future. Thus fabrications are addressed through
studies of generativity, which refers to what can be generated or fabricated
through mathematical rationality.19 Such fabrications can have many forms, and I
just provide a brief summary:20
Fabricating possibilities. Mathematics makes part of a range of design
processes within any technological domain, and here I use technology as referring
not only to technological artefacts, like bridges, airplanes, computers, etc., but
also to less tangible constructions like schemes for production, health
programmes, techniques for surveillance, economic strategies, management
principles, etc. In all such areas mathematics provides powerful means for
identifying new possibilities. Furthermore, no natural-language formulation of
possibilities operates in an equivalent way. For fabricating new possibilities
within our already highly mathematised environment, mathematics is unique.
Fabricating facts. It is common knowledge that mathematics makes it
possible to describe facts. To claim that mathematics fabricates facts might sounds
strange, but let us consider an information system through which knowledge and
information becomes processed. This system is operating in terms of a computer
language including several layers of formal languages. It can be considered a
conglomerate of mathematical algorithms. Such a system can, for instance,
configure a tax system. This system not only describes taxes; it also prescribes
taxes. It condenses decisions about what people have to pay in tax. And there are
information systems not only prescribing taxes, but also medications, treatments,
loan conditions, working standards, etc. And also such prescriptions become life
conditions to a range of people. They turns into facts.
Fabricating risks. Development of technology depends on simulations. This
applies to the construction of cars, airplanes, transport systems, houses, shopping
centres, robots for production, tax systems, etc. Blue-prints for such constructions
have the form of mathematical models. One could assume that a mathematical
19

For a discussion of the notion of generativity, see Skovsmose (2011b).
The following summary follows Skovsmose (2009). Mathematics-based
fabrications have also been addressed in terms of mathematics in action. See,
for instance, Christensen and Skovsmose (2007); Christensen, Skovsmose and
Yasukawa (2009); Skovsmose (2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011); Skovsmose
and Ravn, O. (2011); Skovsmose and Yasukawa (2009); Skovsmose,
Yasukawa and Ravn (draft); Yasukawa, Skovsmose and Ravn (draft).
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simulation model provides a description of the construction when completed. This
is, however, only partly true. The completed construction contains a range of
properties which are not anticipated by the simulation model. Many of the risks we
are now facing – for instance with respect to atomic energy, economy,
transport, health care – are connected to not anticipated implications of
implemented technologies. And a mathematical model only anticipated things
within a particular range of algorithmic rationality.
Fabricating objectivity. Turning an entity into an object of study means that
we strip it for a range of properties. This process is supported by mathematics, which
highlights precisely the mechanical elements of what we are studying: being a new
architecture, a medical treatments, a new configuration of a production line, new
security matters, etc. Mathematics helps to fabricate what becomes addressed as an
object. I many cases this “objectification” makes one assume that we are addressing
things in an “objective” way; but objectivity can be seen as a mathematics-based
fabrication.
Fabricating life worlds. Our life-worlds are submerged in mathematicsbased fabrications.21 If necessary our body becomes treated according to medical
standards about blood pressure, cholesterol, glucose, etc. They are all calculated
standards, with reference to which diagnoses are formulated, medical treatments
are prescribed, and health is monitored. Standards for food quality are calculated
as well: What should be considered acceptable levels of pollution is determined
through statistical investigations, cost-benefit analyses, market interests,
modellings of consumers’ behaviour, all condensed into well-defined numbers
nominating what to call non-problematic. Very many work processes take place in
highly elaborated technological environments, where automatic processes and
human activities are combined into an efficient production system. The market,
including the labour market, is structured according to a huge set of
mathematically formulated laws and principles. Our transport systems and our
means of communication are all expressions of mathematics-based fabrications. In
this sense our life-worlds are fabricated.
Naturally, one can see some overlapping between a genealogy and studies
of generativity, but still these studies are different. Through a genealogy one see
what has been incorporated, or acted-into a phenomenon, while a study of
fabrications addresses what might be acted-out from the phenomenon. Both forms
of investigation play important roles in critical investigations. We have illustrated
21

The notion of life-world is used by Husserl, but I am using the notion rather
liberally (see Skovsmose, 2009).
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generativity in terms mathematics-based fabrications. This way we have
addressed mathematics rationality critically. Naturally, we can also discuss
generativity with respect to mathematics education. This is a crucial feature of
addressing mathematics education critically. However, we now move on to a third
feature of critique.

5. Imagination
Beyond genealogy and generative studies there is one more element that I want to
consider part of a critical approach, namely imagination. Critique in terms of
imagination has been presented by Wright Mills (1959) in terms of sociological
imagination. Through such imagination one can reveal that something being the
case could be seen differently. This means that one reveals a fact as being, not a
necessity but a contingency. I find that a pedagogical imagination makes part of a
critical educational endeavour.
Let us assume that we want to establish democracy in the classroom. We
want teacher and students to address each other on equal terms and to interaction
becomes dialogical. We imagine that this facilitates new learning processes and
ensure an empowerment of the students. They could develop more profound new
competences in reading and writing the world, to use some formulations that have
been explored by Eric Gutstein (2006). And we could expand further our
imagination by exploring not only the notion of democracy but also dialogue,
empowerment, and related notions like equality, and social justice.
However, one can see all such ideas as illusory by highlighting constraints
that configurate the educational reality. We can remind ourselves of the powernetwork that any classroom practice makes part of. Imaginations do not make
changes possible; instead imagination could be the carrier of illusions. Inspired by
Nietzsche one can see pedagogical imagination as worshipping idols. The point of
the careful genealogy that has been conducted with respect to mathematics
education is precisely to reveal that beneath the decorative discourse of aims and
possible improvements one finds a disciplinary regime. Considering the
decorative discourse, everything seems possible, while considering the
disciplinary regime nothing appears possible. And certainly not to establish any
genuine classroom democracy as mathematics education as a discipline is doomed
to insert a prescription readiness into the students and to subject them to a
meticulous labelling. The deconstruction of the classroom reality brings into the
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open a grid of power relations that establishes a range of necessities which turn
pedagogical imagination illusory. This is one line of argument that brings
imagination in discredit.
There is, however one more line of argument discrediting imagination,
drawing directly on Nietzsche’s radical postmodernity. What to think of the range
of the very concepts that resource imaginations such as: democracy, dialogue,
empowerment, equality, social justice, etc.? According to the deconstruction of
the educational reality, such notions might bring about illusions about what could
be done in the classroom. According to Nietzsche, however, such ideas are
themselves idols. Following he presentation in Twilights of the Idols they should
be addresses by a hammer. Idols need to be destroyed. Thus the idols developed
through Modernity represent religious ideas, although in philosophical disguise.
And the ideas that resource pedagogical imaginations belong to the same family
of idols. By celebrating such idols one falsely condemns reality by providing
suggestions for improvements. However, according to Nietzsche, there are no
norms and standards that operate from any elevated position, and certainly not
from any transcendental position. There are no ideas positioned outside the stream
of life. Everything makes part of a chaotic power dynamics. Within a radical
postmodern approach to education there is no use of ideas stimulating a
pedagogical imagination. They just represent romanticism and naivety. The
falsely condemn the educational reality.
But could we get around this sharp corner, and move beyond
postmodernity? Foucault (2000: 33) raises the question if one can talk about
“powerless truth” and “truthless power”. In other words: Could there be any truths
that are not aligned with power? Could there be false powers? Or does power
simply define truths? I do not clearly see Foucault’s response to this question. I
want, however, to answer clearly myself: truth can be powerless, and power can
be truthless. If we make this assumption, we are moving away form Nietzsche’s
radical postmodernity. But are we heading straight into romanticism?
We have to be careful. Nietzsche knocked down any ideals as were they
idols. He feverishly attacked any form of transcendental idealism. To Nietzsche
any ideas are formed within the stream of life. I agree with this. So let us not try to
revive any new form of transcendence. But does that put an end to any ethical
principles and any conception about democracy, equality, justice? My principal
point is that ethical principles and idealised notions need not be revealed or
discovered. They can be constructed. I want to propose a social constructivism
with respect to ethics. I see ethical standards and idealised notions as emerging
through laborious social processes. They are human constructions, and as such
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they are historical; they are temporary; they can be changed. They represent
human visions, expectations, and hopes; and precisely visions, expectations, and
hopes make part to the stream of life. For me imaginations cannot be discharged,
as done with reference to Nietzsche, through the claim that they assume a
transcendental reality. They do not. Imaginations make up part of life. They
represent the claim that what is the case, it not necessarily the case. They try to
reveal facts as contingencies. To me such revelations are important critical
activities.
Let us now return to the claim that imaginations are illusions due to the
very educational realties. Schools as disciplinary institutions are no simple
contingencies. They make part of the whole power-network within which the
educational system is caught, like a small insect in a spider’s net. This powernetwork includes so many restrictions that one cannot assume that, say,
democratic principles could be established in the classroom. This could be
obstructed by the traditions of the classroom, the students’ expectations, the
demands for test and control, the expectations of parents, the organisations of the
textbooks, the general time pressure for the teachers, etc. I agree that all such
observations could very well bring us to the conclusion that establishing
democracy in a particular classroom is (almost) impossible. Still, and this is my
point, imaginations – also imaginations that cannot be implemented – is of critical
importance. For me it is an important critical step to explore the scope of
contingencies. Any particular social institution is positioned between being a
necessity or an open contingency. This also applies to the education. There is no a
priori analysis that designates every feature of this disciplinary institution as
being necessary. It is, likes any other institution, criss-crossed by contingencies.
Naturally, seeing a difference is very different from making a difference, but this
does not make imaginations superfluous. Seeing a difference is an initial critical
act; making a difference might be possible.
I have been concerned about some postmodern limitations of critical
activities which reduce critique to genealogy. I agree that a genealogy is an
extremely important critical device. I also agree that this form of deconstruction
has gained tremendous force through postmodern investigations. My position,
however, is that critique has more dimensions. Genealogy is important, so are
generative investigations, and so is imagination.

6. As conclusion: Beyond postmodernity
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Mathematics education has been criticised though genealogical investigations.
This way it has been revealed how a disciplining order has become incorporated
into this form of education, and how power dynamics are operating in and behind
classroom practices. However, there is no need to stop the critical investigations
by such deconstructions. We can address the generatively of mathematics
education in different contexts and with respect to different groups of students.
What possibilities could be constructed for them? This question could be
addressed not only with reference to further disciplinary initiatives, but also in
terms of students’ perspectives and with reference to their life-worlds. It is
important that any educational practice should become recognised as a contested
practice, and this brings us directly to the notion of pedagogical imagination.
I suggest that a critique of a phenomenon, referring to mathematics or to
mathematics education, addresses its genealogy, its generativity, and that it
becomes contrasted with imaginations. The postmodern form of critique focussed
on genealogy. That gave an impressive depth to many critical studies, but it also
inserted limitations. My point is to broaden the critical activities I suggest that it is
possible to move beyond some limitations postmodernity has put on critical
enterprises.
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